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ARGUMENT 
1. THE KENNEDYS MISREPRESENT CAROLYNN PARK'S TESTIMONY. 
As noted in Schneider's opening Brief, the Trial Court's decision as to the adverse possession 
claim and award of attorney fees was rooted in a mistaken understanding as to the testimony of 
Carolyn Parks, an employee of the Idaho County Assessor's office. More particularly, in issuing 
its Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court stated: 
Carolynn Park works in the mapping department for the Idaho County Assessor. She 
testified that tax payers pay by the tax number assigned to property by assessor. She 
stated that the disputed property was included in both tax numbers. She testified that 
the number of acres for which the Keunedys were taxed, that the disputed property 
had to have been included in their tax parcel. 
( R. P. 20-21). Within its Decision Memorandum, in which the trial court explained the basis of its 
decision regarding the adverse possession claim and its award of attorney fees, the Court reiterated 
the vital role the perceived testimony of Ms. Park had in the Court's decision making process and 
ultimate conclusions. The trial court stated: 
Also uncontested and irrefutable was the Idaho County Assessor's Mapper, Carolynn 
Park, who testified that both the Kennedys and Mr. Schneider had been assessed and 
taxed for the disputed property. 
(R.61). 
The reporters transcript proves that Ms. Park actually testified to the exact opposite of what 
the Court believed she asserted at trial. The trial court's mistaken understanding of the testimony 
appears based in part in the misleading arguments from the Kennedys. 
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Despite having the benefit of the trial transcript, the Kennedys continue to misrepresent the content 
of Ms. Park's testimony by claiming that she testified that both the Schneiders and Kennedys paid 
taxes upon the same property. As noted in Respondents' Brief, 
In her [Carolynn Park's] testimony, as the District judge found, she unequivocally 
states at (Tr. 108 Ln. 105) as follows: 
Q ... Did it appear to you that while the acreage for Mr. Kennedy was bigger 
and the acreage for Mr. Schneider was bigger than what you had, that they both, 
perhaps, paid tax on the same piece? 
A ... Yes. 
(Respondents' Brief, Page 9.) This Kennedy's excerpt disregards Ms. Park's subsequent testimony 
in which she expressly denied stating that both the Kennedys and Schneiders paid taxes on the same 
property or that the Kennedys paid taxes on the disputed property. Ms. Park's testimony at trial was 
as follows: 
Q. So, when you testified earlier that from your perspective Kennedy was paying 
taxes on the property- ... 
A. I don't believe I said he [Kennedy] was paying taxes on that area. He was paying 
taxes on Tax 16 and his other tax numbers. 
Q. Okay. Which would be Tax 28? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But-
A. And 30. 
Q ..... So, when you're saying he's [Kennedy's] paying taxes on-all youk!1ow is he's 
paying taxes on Tax Lot 16, Tax Lot 28, and the other tax parcels that are identified 
on the-
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A. On the tax bill, yes, yes. 
Q. Tax bill, okay. And the same would go for the Schneiders, the taxes that you 
were aware that were paid, all you know is if they're paid ... as identified on the tax 
bill? 
A. Yes 
(Tr. P. 121, Ls. 2-18) Further evidencing the Court's and the Kennedys' erroneous understanding 
ofMr. Park's testimony are the maps Ms. Park prepared which visually establish that the Kennedys 
did not pay taxes on the disputed property and prove that the Kennedys and Schneiders did not pay 
taxes on the same property. The maps highlighting the property assessed and which taxes were paid 
were as follows: 
+ I I 
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Kennedy Property (Pg. 5, Def. Ex. C) Schneider Property (Pg, 5, Def. Ex, B) 
Given that the trial court's ruling on the adverse possession claim was grounded in an 
erroneous belief as to the facts presented at trial, the trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
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2. CONTRARY TO THE KENNEDYS' ASSERTIONS, THE AMOUNT OF LAND 
THEY OCCUPIED AND WHICH THEY WERE ASSESSED TAXES WAS NOT THE 
SAME. 
There is no dispute that under both theories of adverse possession pursued by the Keunedys, 
they were required to prove that they paid taxes on the disputed property. The crux of the 
Kennedys' argument, and the trial court's finding, is that the Kennedys satisfied the tax payment 
element by proving that the area of land they occupied was the same as the area of land for which 
they were assessed taxes. 
Within their briefing on appeal, the Kennedys argue that in 1999 they acquired a 50- strip 
of old railroad right of way along the west end of tax lot 28, their home property. (Respondents' 
Brief, page 2). As a result of this increase in land, the Kennedys, on appeal, present separate acreage 
analysis for the time periods before and after the 1999 land purchase. Notably, the Kennedys rely 
upon Exhibit 23 for depicting the pre-1999 acreage assessment and upon Exhibit 20 for the post-
1999 acreage assessment. Both analysis; however, are fatally defective as they each utilize 
inaccurate information. 
A. Kennedys' Pre 1999 Area Calculation. 
At page 2 of Respondent's Brief, the Kennedys claim they were assessed taxes on 14.588 
acres and that they occupied 14.71 acres. According to the Kennedys, since the acreage assessed 
taxes and the area occupied are "almost identical", they satisfied the tax payment element of their 
adverse possession claim. The basis for the Kennedys' calculations, however, are inaccurate. 
-4-
As noted above, the Kennedys relied upon Exhibit 23 to depict the pre-1999 area ofland they 
were assessed taxes since it identifies the land owned by the Kennedys prior to their 1999 purchase 
ofthe 50 foot wide land strip. In calculating the area of the land occupied pre-1999, however, the 
Kennedys rely upon a post-1999 property description. More particularly, the Kennedys utilize the 
calculations of Ms. Pearsons, who determined that the acreage occupied by the Kennedys pre-1999 
was 14.71 acres. This opinion, in turn was based upon her calculation that tax lot 28, less the 
excepted properties, contained 8.1 acres; that tax lot 16 contained 2.01 acres; that the relevant 
portion of tax lot 19 contained either .56 or .59 acres; and, that the disputed property (which she 
included the acreage for tax lot 30) contained 4.04 acres. 
The inherent problem is that Ms Pearson's calculations relating to tax lot 28 utilizes the post-
1999 property description which excludes more lots from tax lot 28 than what existed in the pre-
1999 property description I. With regard to tax lot 28, the pre-1999 property description listed the 
Kennedy ownership as being Tax # 28 Less Tax #'s 113,220,236. (Pl.Exhibit 23) The post-1999 
property description; however, lists the Kennedyproperty as including Tax 28 Less Tax #'s 113,220, 
236, 268 & 269. By using the post-1999 property description, the Kennedys' pre-1999 acreage 
analysis is incorrect. 
IThe timing of Ms. Pearsons work is found in her testimony that she started work on the 
Kennedy property analysis a couple of years prior to the 2009 trial. (Tr. P. 13, Ls. 3 -9) Moreover, 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 55, which is a hand drawing depicting Ms. Pearsons' calculations for the area of 
tax lot 28, lists a date of 51712007. 
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B. Kennedys' Post 1999 Acreage Calculations. 
At page 6 of Respondent's brief, the Kennedys' change their calculations somewhat to take 
into consideration the changes in the Kelmedys' land ownership after they purchased the 50 foot strip 
ofland. They argue that post 1999, the Kennedys actually occupied 15.118 acres and were being 
assessed and billed for 15.066 acres. Once again, the calculations used by the Kennedys are 
incorrect. 
The Kennedys' claim that the purchase of the 50' strip ofland added.478 acres to the post 
1999 tax assessment and land occupied by the Kennedys. (Respondents' Brief, page 6) The 
Kennedys' calculate the area of the 50 foot strip ofland by simply subtracting the pre-1999 tax 
assessment acreage of 14.588 acres (Exhibit 23) from the post-1999 tax assessment acreage of 
15.066 (Exhibit 20). (Respondent's Brief, page 6). Employing this methodology results in an area 
of.478 acres (15.066 - 14.588 = .478 acres.). This methodology, however, is fatally flawed. 
The problem with the Kennedys' methodology is that the property description within the 
15.066 tax assessment (Exhibit 20) differs from the pre-1999 tax assessment. The differences in the 
pre-1999 and post-1999 descriptions are as follows: 
PRE 1999 POST 1999 
Exhibit 23 Exhibit 20 
Total Acreage 14.588 Total Acreage 15.066 
T32 N R4E SEC 20 T32 N R4E SEC 20 
Tax #'s 16 & 30 Tax #'s 16,28 & 30 along with a SO' wide 
Tax #28 Less Tax #'s 113, 220, 236 strip ofRR ROW along W Side of Tax #28 
Less Tax #'8113,220,236,268 & 269. 
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Since the two property descriptions vary by more than the purchase of the 50 foot stip of land, a 
simple comparison of the two exhibits cannot be used to calculate the acreage of that 50 foot strip 
of land. 
The actual value of the 50 foot land strip, however, is easily calculated by one of two 
methods. First, the actual acreage for the land strip can be determined by comparing the acreage 
contained within Exhibit 23 with the acreage contained in the Kennedys' 2000 quitclaim deed 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 5). This method will produce an accurate result since the only difference in the 
land descriptions used in these two records is the purchase of the 50 foot strip ofland. 
The Quitclaim Deed identifies a total acreage owned of 15 .368 acres. (Plaintiff s Exhibit 5) 
Subtracting the acreage listed in Exhibit 23 from the acreage listed in the quitclaim deed results in 
a finding that the strip ofland occupies 78 acres. (15.368 acres -14.588acres =.78 acres) 
The accuracy of the .78 acreage assessment is confirmed by using Ms. Pearsons' 
measurement of the west side of Tax lot 28 and multiplying it by 50 feet. As noted by the 
Respondents, Exhibit 55 was prepared by Ms. Pearsons to show the area of tax lot 28 less the 
excepted parcels. The West boundary of tax 28 is identified in that exhibit as being 674.03 feet. 
Thus, the area of fifty foot strip ofland is 33,701.5 sq. feet (50' x 674.03' = 33,701.5 sq. ft.) This 
area, in turn, equates to .774 acres (1 acre = 43,560 sq. ft. 33,701.5/43,560 = .77367 sq. ft.). 
Substituting the correct acreage for the 50 foot strip of land, results in an increase of .302 
acres to the total acreage alleged to be occupied by the Kennedys. Thus, by using the proper figures, 
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the total acreage allegedly occupied by the Kennedys is 15.42 acres rather than the 15.118 acres 
claimed in Respondents' Brief. Clearly, the occupied acreage of 15.42 is not the same as the 15.06 
acres assessed in taxes. 
3. The Kennedy's Reliance upon the Holdings of White v. Bovdstun, Wilson v. Gladish. 
and Flynn v. Allison Are Misplaced as the Facts in Those Cases Are Readily 
Distinguishable from the Facts in the Case at Bar. 
The Kennedys argue that the facts of this case are so similar to the facts in White v. Boydstun, 
91 Idaho 615, 428 P.2d 747 (1967) that it is "spooky". (Respondents' Brief, page 6) A review of 
the facts, however, finds the case so dissimilar that the holding in White is rendered inapplicable to 
the case at bar. White v. Boydstun, involved a quite title action to a 1.01 acre parcel ofland located 
in McCall Idaho. The disputed property was located adjacent to a .98 acre parcel which was deeded 
to White. A fence enclosed the two parcels as one tract. White was assessed taxes for a two acre 
parcel even though the disputed parcel was only 1.01 acres. Furthermore, it was undisputed that 
the tax assessor's office attributed to White the entire property tax assessment and that White paid 
all the taxes assessed. It was further established that Boydstun, while claiming under a right oftitle, 
had not paid taxes on the disputed property. White, 91 Idaho at 618 -619, 428 P.2d 750-751. 
Boydstun claimed ownership of the 1.01 acre parcel under claim oftitle. The trial court 
quieted tittle in favor of White. On appeal, Boydstun argued that White had failed to prove that he 
paid taxes on the disputed property. This Court affirmed the lower court, finding that "[ w]hen taxes 
to land adversely claimed are in fact paid, an erroneous or uncertain assessment will not affect the 
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efficacy of the actual payments." White, 91 Idaho at 622, 428 P.2d at 754. 
Unlike in White, the case at bar does not involve erroneous or uncertain tax assessments. 
Moreover, unlike in White, the Kennedys were not billed for the taxes assessed on disputed property. 
Instead, the taxes assessed on the disputed property were included only in the Schneider's tax bill. 
Thoroughly evidencing the Kennedys' misunderstanding of and reliance upon White is the 
excerpt from White v. Boydstun, the Kennedys incorporate within their Respondents' Brief, which 
states: 
It should be noted that in the analogous situation concerning adverse occupation of 
land next to a boundary line between the property of the adverse claimant and his 
opponent, continuous adverse occupation will extend a true boundary line beyond the 
occupiers deed limits, so that the payment of taxes assessed on the property deeded 
is deemed the payment of taxes on lands in the claimants possession. 
(Respondents' Brief, page 7). This quoted language, relied upon by the Kennedys, was expressly 
rejected by this Court in Trappet v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 533, 633 P.2d 592, 598 (1981). In 
Trappett, this Court stated that [s]ince application of the White dicta would eliminate the tax 
requirement in virtually every adverse possession case, it is hereby disapproved." Trappet, 102 
Idaho at 533, 633 P.2d at 598. 
The next case relied upon by Kennedy, as well as the trial court, is Wilson v. Gladish, 140 
Idaho 861, 103 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2004). In Wilson, the adverse possessor claimed .66 acres of 
property and was assessed on .66 acres of property. The tax assessment failed to particularly 
describe the land being taxed such that it could not be identified. Wilson, 140 Idaho at 866, 103 P.3d 
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at 478. As noted by the Court in Wilson, 
On the facts of this case, the assessment against Wilson was made following a 
viewing of the disputed property, and the assessment describes the property being 
taxed by a generic description which indicated the quantity of property being taxed, 
but not the specific property itself. Wilson paid taxes according to that 
assessment....Wilson claimed 0.66 acres of property and was assessed on 0.66 acres 
of property, and the assessment failed to particularly describe the land being taxed 
such that it could be identified. We therefore conclude that Wilson met the tax 
payment requirement.. 
Wilson, 140 Idaho at 867, 103 P.3d at 480. 
Without question, the pertinent facts in Wilson do not exist in the case at bar. Here, the tax 
assessments identifY the specific land being taxed with particularity instead of by using generic 
descriptions. Moreover, as established above, the acreage assessed to the Kennedys does not equal 
the land claimed by the Kennedys. 
Finally, the Kennedys cite to Flynn v. Allison, 97 Idaho 618, 549 P.2d 1065 (1976). InFlynn 
v. Allison, the property owner, Flynn, purchased two contiguous 1 OO-foot parcels. At the time of the 
purchase the property was unsurveyed and unimproved. Later, Boise Cascade commissioned a 
survey of the area for a possible purchase which fell through. The survey stakes were left in place. 
Based upon a misunderstanding of the survey markers, Flynn erected a fence; cleared the land; 
planted a lawn trees; and, located his septic tank in that area. A later survey revealed that Flynn had 
encroached about sixty feet north onto the adjoining landowners property. 
In Flynn, taxes were assessed based upon the amount of river frontage property owned. The 
tax assessments did not precisely describe the property taxed. 97 Idaho at 621,549 P.2d at 1068. 
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The uncontroverted evidence established that Flynn was assessed taxes for 200 feet of river front 
property, that Flynn only claimed ownership of 200ft river front land, and that Flynn paid the taxes 
assessed. The trial court found in favor of Flynn. 
On appeal, the tax payment requirement was addressed. In analyzing the issue, this Court 
held that, 
Boundary disputes are not uncommon in this state, as witnessed by the relative 
frequency with which this Court has wrestled with the problem, and we realize that 
the adverse possessor faces a almost impossible task in attempting to prove that he 
paid taxes on the land he claims when the facts show simply that he has mistakenly 
shifted his boundaries, as in this case, sixty feet into his neighbor's property. We 
hold that under these circumstances, in which the adverse claimant occupied the 
same amount of land as that which for which he was assessed, and, further, the 
county property tax assessment sheet did not particularly describe the land being 
taxed, the requirement ofLC. 5-210 that the adverse claimant has 'paid all the taxes, 
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to law' has been satisfied. 
The pertinent circumstances which existed in Flynn do not exist in the case at bar. Unlike 
in Flynn, the Kennedys did not occupy the very same amount ofland that they were being assessed 
taxes. Moreover, the tax assessment records in the case at bar unambiguously describe the property 
being taxed with particularity. Therefore, the rationale for the result reached in Flynn is not present 
in the case at bar. 
Based upon the above, the trial court's holding was clearly erroneous Accordingly, the 
Schneiders' respectfully request this court reverse the trial court's decision. 
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4. THE DISTRICT COURT AWARD OF FEES CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION. 
Undoubtedly, the trial court's attorney fee award was based upon its mistaken belief as to the 
testimony presented by Carolynn Park. As discussed in detail above, the trial court believed that Ms. 
Park expressed the opinion that the taxes assessed against the Kennedys included the disputed 
property. Clearly, the trial judge's memory of what was presented could not have been more at 
odds with what was actually was presented at trial. Ms. Park expressly denied that the Kennedys 
having paid taxes on the disputed property or that both partys paid taxes on the disputed property. 
The trial courts mistaken understanding should, alone, result in the award for attorney fees being 
reversed. 
Furthermore, as noted within Respondents' Brief, the trial court attached significance to Leah 
Meager's testimony. The trial court determined that Ms. Meager's review ofthe property and belief 
that the property at issue was included within the assessed property somehow rendered a defense to 
the adverse possession claim as frivolous. Contrary to the trial court's position, Ms. Meager's 
testimony was oflittle to no value. The only time that she reviewed the property was in 2003 which 
was after the time period at issue. Furthermore, Ms. Meager's belief that the disputed property was 
contained within the taxes assessed to the Kennedys was directly contradicted by the testimony of 
Carolynn Park. 
Given the trial court's award of attorney fees is based upon a misnnderstanding of the facts 
presented, the Courts basis for award of fees is improper and constitutes an abuse of the trial court's 
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discretion. Accordingly, the Schneiders respectfully request this Court vacate the award of attorney 
fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Schneiders respectfully request that this Court reverse the 
lower court's decision granting the Kennedys title to the disputed property by way of adverse 
possession. Furthermore, the Schneiders request this Court vacate the award of attorney fees in the 
case below and reject the Kennedys' request for attorney fees on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this & day of April, 2010. 
CLARK and FEENEY LLP 
an D. Hally, a Mem er ofthe firm 
ttorneys for Appellants Schneider 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this L ~ day of April, 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docmnent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Mr. Dennis Albers 
Attorney at Law 
401 W. North Street 
PO Box 314 
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